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The Piety Movement in an American Suburb: The Experiences of Women of the Islamic Circle 
of North America on Staten Island 
By Aisha Raheel 
Advisor: Professor Mucahit Bilici 
 
 
 The participation of women in fundamentalist movements has always posed a problem 
for feminist analysis because it disrupts the belief that all women see themselves as victims who 
share a common interest in ending this oppression. More broadly, portrayals of fundamentalists 
as people who are uniquely opposed to modern life are simplistic and dehumanizing. They are 
particularly problematic for Muslims because often, all Muslims whether they are 
fundamentalists are not, are portrayed as adhering to the same uncompromising, fanatical, and 
violent form of faith.  
 The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) was founded in 1971 to provide its 
members with supportive religious communities. Its primary aim was education: to educate its 
diverse membership about Islam so that they would adhere to correct Islamic values. Its female 
members, who often wear hijab and marginalized through practices of gender segregation, could 
be mistaken as icons of the oppressed Muslim woman. This paper profiles the lives of ordinary 
Pakistani women who are members of the ICNA chapter on Staten Island. They are not the 
assertive activists that are often associated with Islamist activism in the West. They are ordinary 
women whose adoption of Islamist piety intersects with the spiritual and practical needs of their 




Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, this study proposes that the binary of oppression and 
liberation that is used to understand women’s lives is unhelpful not only because women not 
only don’t see themselves as oppressed but sometimes don’t see becoming free as a priority 
either. These women were raised in Pakistan, a patriarchal society whose social norms they 
unquestionably accepted. They were satisfied with their lives there yet reluctantly emigrated to 
the United States at the behest husbands and families. Once there, they needed to find new 
friends, and larger communities that also represented familiar cultural patterns. These practical 
needs were met by joining their local ICNA chapter, attending its religious gatherings, and 
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Every Friday, my mother would get ready to go out. My father, who was usually busy 
with other things, would take notice: 
“Where are you going?” he would ask. 
“To dars,” my mother replies. My mother would gather her coat hurrying to leave the 
house. 
 “Again!” Baba would reply, “but didn’t they have dars yesterday? Who will make 
dinner? When will you be back?” Without a word, my mother would leave the house closing the 
door behind her. Every week, a scene like this took place almost every time my mother went to 
dars. 
 Dars are regularly held social  gatherings where men or women get together to listen to 
recitations of the Qur’an and here its exegetical commentaries from the group leader. The dars 
my mother attends are sponsored by the local chapter of the Islamic Circle of North America 
(henceforth ICNA), of which she is a member. ICNA is the flagship organization of Sunni 
orthodoxy among American Muslims, especially those of South Asian background. It promotes 
an Islam that has a heavy emphasis on Sunni orthodoxy which often centers around correct ritual 
practice, and traditional gender roles for women. Proponents of Islamic orthodoxy do not have 
the behavior of my mother in mind when they speak of Islamic conceptions of marriage and 
family life. Neither do proponents of secularism who often see fundamentalist women as 
brainwashed and subjugated. In this thesis I explore the lives of ICNA women on Staten Island. 




in their everyday lives? Does religion bring a sense of self-actualization and agency in these 
women’s lives, or does it lead to them being secluded at home as wives and mothers? 
 
II. Significance of Research 
 Muslim women are often portrayed as passive, silent, and brainwashed. Such depictions 
can range from the condescending to the sinister. When Donald Trump wrongly suggested that 
Ghazala Khan, mother of slain U.S. Captain Humayun Khan, was not allowed to speak at the 
Democratic Convention while standing beside her husband: he was making an accusation that 
invoked the image of the meek Muslim woman.1 Around the same time, a documentary was 
aired in the UK titled Undercover Mosque: The Return, in which a journalist secretly filmed 
women in Salafi study groups in London, exposing the hardline Saudi Islam that was being 
promoted.2 Although the documentary stressed that the group rejected terrorism, it nonetheless 
implied that Salafi teachings inspired terrorism, and encouraged Muslims to segregate 
themselves from the rest of British society. The Muslim woman manages to be both meek and 
submissive as well as violent and intolerant at the same time. 
 It is not entirely wrong to associate Islamic modest dress with separation. Globally and 
historically, women and family life were relegated to the private sphere. By not discussing their 
marital lives in public, revealing the names of the women of their families, and keeping hidden 
their life stories and achievements, Muslims believed they were preserving the modesty of 
women. In doing so, they also silenced the contributions to society made by female scholars, 
 
1 Anne Geran, “Trump Stirs Outrage after He Lashes Out at the Muslim Parents of a Dead U.S. Soldier” Washington 
Post, July 30 2016. 
 




poets, and ordinary women. This leads to a cultural reticence of people to discuss their personal 
stories with people whom they know will want to share them. Exploring this complex reality is 
important for a proper understanding of the variety of Muslim experience in the American 
context. 
 I conducted my research as an insider. I attended dars for young women regularly. My 
mother is an active member of ICNA who attends dars regularly. I got suggestions for interview 
subjects, and contact information from my parents. They knew everyone that I interviewed. I 
interviewed nine subjects: six women and three men. They included seven immigrants from 
Pakistan, one from India, and an American-born woman who nonetheless was part of the same 
generation. All subjects are solidly middle class. My thesis will center around the five immigrant 
women as providing the main stories. The stories of the other four participants playing a 
supporting role by adding further context. All six women had university degrees, were married, 
and had children. Two of the women were housewives while four had paid employment. Those 
with paid employment include a doctor, a school administrator, and two paraprofessionals. By 
contrast, all of their husbands have paid employment as white collar professionals. Their spouses 
include doctors, accountants, and IT professionals. 
 There were limits to my intimacy with my subjects. Phone interviews, although more 
convenient for the interviewee, create more space between the researcher and the subject. At the 
same time, the questions I asked were personal ones relating to their emigration to the United 
States, personal religious practices, and how those practices affected relationships with their 
families. For all that, people spoke with a surprising amount of candor about their religious 
journeys. In the Pakistani community, privacy is of paramount importance, and personal subjects 




have been changed in order to protect their privacy. The distance between researcher and subject 
may have made this easier. A second layer of distance was generational. Although I was born in 
Pakistan like most of my subjects, I was raised in the United States. I was also born in 1994, 
making me a part of the millennial generation. I have grown up with a different set of social 
realities which many older Pakistanis are aware of but find hard to understand. My sample is 
small and homogenous. These are not the perspectives of the activists and speakers who give the 
speeches at conferences. They are not leaders of the national organizations. These are the voices 
of ordinary men and women. Voices of women are particularly important. They tend to be more 
active in religious life than men, but they are also less visible. For example, gender segregation is 
a perennial feature of any Muslim religious gathering. Segregation can create comfortable all 
female spaces for women to relax in but more broadly, it also means that there are no visible 
women leaders. Yet they are more diligent in attending dars then men are, teach in weekend and 
Islamic day schools, and are active in organizing community activities like Ramadan iftars and 
fundraising dinners. Women play a crucial, if invisible, role in Muslim community life. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 Since often all Muslims are depicted as adhering to the same radical, uncompromising 
form of religion, it is presumed that all Muslims are fundamentalists. Therefore, all Muslims are 
affected by negative depictions of fundamentalism even if they are not fundamentalist or even 
pious believers. As a consequence, the popular and academic literature that is produced to 
challenge negative and simplistic portrayals is vast. The landscape becomes even more 




Stereotypes of women were not the main theme of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), he 
discusses them at some length when analyzing the depiction of the odalisque in the novels of 
Gustave Flaubert. Others who have discussed the depiction of Muslim women in more detail 
include Jansen (1996), and Alloula (1986). If anyone represents the stereotype of the oppressed 
Muslim woman, it is fundamentalist Muslim women with their penchant for covering their hair 
and faces, and preference for traditional family roles. Yet stereotypes of Muslim women as 
submissive and powerless affect all women of Muslim heritage, not only those who become 
fundamentalists. Not surprisingly, there is a substantial literature on Islamist and conservative 
Muslim women that challenges these stereotypes (Mahmood 2012, Ahmed 2010, Ahmed 2007). 
 A canonical study of the Muslim women involved in fundamentalism is Politics of Piety 
by anthropologist Saba Mahmood (2011). Mahmood stresses that the women of Egypt’s mosque 
movement were not involved as activists in the Muslim Brotherhood though the Da’wah of 
Zainab al-Ghazali was influential as a precursor to the mosque movement [explain what is 
Da’wah]. Her study is valuable for the theory of agency that Mahmood used to explain the 
women’s choices. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, she suggests that 
the way people inhabit the norms may oppress the subject, but it also forms the subject.3 The 
social norms that a subject inhabits are the necessary ground through which the subject 
encounters her agency. Mahmood questions whether all human beings have a natural desire for 
freedom and choice if only they were not blocked by relations of power that are external. 
Presumably, if the power dynamics within families, larger communities, and in larger society 
were eliminated, human beings would have the full autonomy that they supposedly naturally 
wanted. Going further, Mahmood rejects the binary between oppressed and oppressor. Not every 
 
3  Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, (Princeton: Princeton University 




act can be understood as fitting into a binary where the oppressed is always resisting oppression. 
This framework has the advantage of capturing the voices of women who may stress the 
importance of spiritual obligation as a reason for their participation in halaqas, or wearing of 
hijab. It also takes into account the reality that many women do not grow up in a context where 
progressive values, or female participation in public activities are a social norm. Such realities 
may render the piety movement as promoted in ICNA’s neighborhood study circles more 
normal. Mahmood’s theories of agency and the self can be applied to a variety of contexts. 
 Study of American Islam as a field is relatively new (Bilici 2012: 19). Yet several 
histories of Islam in America, or specific ethnic communities do exist. All such studies typically 
mention the Islamist roots of the major Islamic organizations (Ghanea-Basiri, Ahmed 2011, 
Mohammad-Arif, 2002). Amina Mohammad-Arif’s work on South Asian Muslims in New York 
City provides a detailed evolution of ICNA from a branch of the Jamat-e-Islamito an 
independent American organization. As with Muslim communities elsewhere in the world, there 
are many studies dealing with the agency of Muslim women. These include Ahmed (2011), 
Karim (2009), and Moxley-Rouse (2004). There is also a body of literature that discusses 
conversion to Islam by Western women, (Anway 1993, Van Neuwkerk 2003). Leila Ahmed’s 
study, A Quiet Revolution, charts how the activist streak of Islamists movements inspired 
women to become activists for justice and civil rights for their communities. Her study profiles 
several, assertive public personalities like Ingrid Mattson and Asra Nomani. In contrast, the 
women profiled here are ordinary people who live normal lives. Paradoxically both their very 
normality coupled with their visible difference obscures their stories from view. They are not 
silent and oppressed as portrayed by the media, but they also are not the assertive agents that one 




piety in everyday life as well as the role that pre-existing cultural logics and anxieties played in 
making the adoption of Islamist piety a possibility. Activists play an important and visible role in 
community life. However, it is just as important to emphasize that the promotion of Islamist 
piety was also a process that happened from below, , something that people also chose to 
participate in. Her description of intra-Muslim politics could be a follow up to the description of 
ICNA in Mohammad Arif’s study of South Asian Muslims in New York. 
 
IV. Emigration and Transition 
 The subjects interviewed for this research came to the United States roughly between 
1984 and 1994. As previously mentioned, all interviewees were educated, and had white-collar 
jobs or were married to men with white collar professions. All were able to achieve a middle-
class life within a short period of time. Only three men were interviewed yet they spoke more 
about economic incentives and better quality of life as a reason for leaving Pakistan than women 
did. In the words of one of my informants:  
At that time none of my friends went back. Everybody wanted to stay here. The main 
objective was to stay here. There were more opportunities here compared to back home. 
Because at that time in Pakistan in my computer science field, there was not much. There 
were opportunities but not that much.4 
 
A second informant recalled that, 
There was a lottery system to select people, and I was selected in that. The conditions in 
Karachi were getting worse and worse. I was unable to really survive in Karachi. So, we 
 




decided, let's take this opportunity and move to America. There were political 
disturbances. There was extortion of money, fear of our lives if we didn’t pay them.5 
 
 In their reasons, both men were typical of the larger South Asian community. Most 
immigrants from the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan, India, or Bangladesh) were educated, urban 
professionals looking for better economic opportunities or a better quality of life.6 A second 
reason was also cited by one of the interviewees: political instability in Karachi, an important 
urban center in Pakistan. In the 1990s, Karachi was torn apart by violence between Muhajir and 
Sindi political factions as Sindis tried to reduce Muhajir political hegemony in the city. The 
resulting violence contributed to the decisions of many Urdu speakers to emigrate to North 
America or the Gulf states. 
 The interviewees were representative of larger South Asian migration patterns in a 
second way. Women typically followed their husbands to the United States. South Asian men 
were usually married with young families, or single. Once settled, men would find a wife in their 
homeland, or bring over their families if they were already married. The reverse: immigration at 
the instigation of a wife who then sponsored her husband was uncommon. As a consequence, the 
reasons cited above did not loom large in the narratives of most female migrants. In general, the 
reasons women left Pakistan could be summarized in one word: marriage. Afiya’s story is 
typical, “I got married and my husband was here. He was studying computer science. So I came 
here.” 7 Shahana, who emigrated to the United States in 1994 and today works as a teaching 
assistant, expressed no desire to leave Pakistan: “I came here when I got married, and I came 
 
5 Informant 2, Interview by Author, September 28 2019 
6 Aminah Mohammad-Arif, Salaam America: South Asians in New York, (Anthem Press 2002), 36-38 
 




here because my husband was here. I never ever thought of moving to another country because I 
was happy in Pakistan.” 8 
”I don’t know what it is with other people that they want to come to America.“, says Shazia, 
another Pakistani who emigrated around the same time, “I don’t care. It made no difference to 
me because my husband was here. He was here. Fine.” In contrast to other women, Tabassum 
describes the following situation: 9 
We just stayed because some medical needs were there. I could get better treatment in 
this country. But once we settled down, and my husband realized that it was not as bad as 
what he was thinking, it worked out very well. 
 
Tabassum cited health care needs as her reason for leaving Pakistan. In her account, it is 
not easy to tell who made the decision to emigrate though she does indicate that this move was 
necessary if undesirable. She makes clear that her husband did not want to leave. She also 
displays her own ambivalence about leaving, “We didn’t come here to earn money. We didn’t 
come here to do something.” Although Tabassum chooses to downplay her own agency in 
persuading her husband to emigrate, she still indicates that leaving seemed necessary. Whatever 
the family’s medical needs were, they were severe enough that her reluctant husband could be 
persuaded to emigrate. Subsequently, her husband needed to be encouraged to keep trying, to 
believe that the family’s economic situation would improve. She was not a passive actor. 
 In their stories of migration, the women may appear passive actors with no voice. Yet 
there was some variation. Some opposed it, some were indifferent, and some played an active 
 
8 Shahana, Interview by author, January 16, 2020. 
 




role in persuading their spouse that they should emigrate. They didn’t leave because they 
opposed their government for political reasons, and that they were satisfied with life in Pakistan. 
Women didn’t always have a choice about whether to leave or not but had to follow their 
husbands in most cases. 
 All the immigrants interviewed eventually moved to Staten Island. Staten Island is New 
York’s whitest and most conservative borough. As recently as 2010, the borough had a 67% 
white majority, and voted for Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Yet the borough has 
equally been shaped by New York’s long immigration history from early Dutch colonial settlers 
to the nineteenth century emigration of Irish and Italian Catholics. 10 In the 1970s, many white 
New Yorkers moved to Staten Island from Brooklyn to avoid increasing rents and racial conflict. 
Although Staten Island is the least diverse borough, it is slowly being transformed by the post-
1965 immigration wave from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. As Pakistani 
immigrants became more prosperous, they would move out of traditional areas of urban 
settlement in Queens or Brooklyn following the same path tread by the previous generation of 
Italian Americans. Staten Island is exactly the sort of area that many middle-class professional 
immigrants aspire to live in. It is a borough of residential suburbs where middle class couples 
can afford to buy a home, and send their children to a good school. Its proximity to Brooklyn and 
New Jersey allows people to live close to their workplaces, or to the ethnic stores and restaurants 
that enable immigrants to maintain ethnic authenticity while living in white suburban 
neighborhoods. Although Staten Island’s Muslim community is small, it is vibrant. There are 
 
 10 Flannigan R., Kramer D. Staten Island: Conservative Bastion in a Liberal City, (University of America Press, 





eight mosques on the island. 11 The mosques are divided along ethnic lines including Albanian, 
Pakistani, West African, and Arab masjids. With the growth of the Muslim community has come 
the establishment of chapters of national Muslim organizations notably the Muslim American 
Society (MAS), and Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA). 12 
 On the face of it, Pakistani migrants integrated into American life very quickly. They 
seem to be establishing themselves in Staten Island, and attaining a middle-class lifestyle. But 
finding friends, a social life and a world that was familiar proved to be challenging. Although 
they now had nice homes in nice neighborhoods, Pakistani women lived far away from their 
fellow immigrants. The lives that women were used to in Pakistan changed drastically. They 
found themselves separated from their extended families back home but without the comfort and 
familiarity that ethnic ghettos traditionally provide. Afiya, who was the only informant to move 
directly to Staten Island (as opposed to passing through Brooklyn, Queens, or some other part of 
the country altogether), observed the sense of isolation: 
People were friendly but it was a big cultural difference as compared to Pakistan. This 
was my first time to come to a Western country. I was missing my own friends and 
family back home. The language was like, I learned English. But you know spoken 
language was a little difficult for me to understand and people around me they had, it was 
a difference compared to Pakistan as far as their clothing and so many other things.13 
 
 
11 Lori Weintrob and Cyril Gosh, “Whose Dreams? Debates on Immigration in the Museum, Mosque, and 
Classroom“ in Beyond Bystanders, (Brilsense, 2017), 117-129. 
 
12 The Islamic Circle of North America was founded in the United States in 1971 to promote a strong religious 
among American Muslims. Although most of the membership is South Asian, it promotes a strong emphasis on 
outreach to non-Muslims. The Muslim American Society (MAS), was founded in 1992 to promote a stronger 
religious identity in Arab communities. 
 




Shahana, who had previously expressed that she hadn’t wanted to emigrate provided a moving 
testimony of her struggles: 
The first ten years were very difficult for me because I was not used to it. I didn’t do any 
kind of job before. I was born and grew up in a well-established family. My father owned 
a big business. We had a good lifestyle back home. So, I never thought of going to 
another country to settle down just for a better standard of living because I would say that 
before coming here that we were having good enough living standards back home. 
But when I came here, it was very difficult for me because I felt like I’m not getting the 
same lifestyle that I grew up with. And then I was not used to going out by myself. I was 
very shy. I was always dependent on my family like on my father, my brothers. So, when 
I came here, I had to do a lot of things on my own because my husband was working. I 
was pregnant also when I came here. I still remember that it was very hard for me… 
those ten years. My personality is that I’m always very positive. I felt when I came here I 
was feeling very lonely. At the same time, I was thinking that I am blessed now.14 
 
From the stories of transition told above, two things can be concluded. Reasons for 
emigrating were economic or materialistic in nature when it was a free choice. However, it was 
almost always men who made the decision to leave. From the standpoint of most female 
interviewees, emigration was not a freely made decision so that women typically cited their 
husbands as a reason for leaving. They did not come to the United States with a desire to 
reinvent themselves. The pressure to assimilate into a white, Protestant mainstream was not there 
because in the post-Civil Rights era the United States came to view itself as a multicultural 
nation. However, moving to a new country was not easy. In the United States, immigrants who 
practiced a religion that was different from the American mainstream had to organize their own 
formal religious institutions and informal spaces. What this looked like, depended a lot on what 
 




religious practice looked like in the country of origin as well as the demands placed on people by 
the conditions in their new country. 
Most Muslim immigrants were not Islamists. But the national organizations that were 
founded to represent the Muslim community were all founded by immigrants who had been 
involved in Islamist movements in their home countries. What mattered most to people who 
migrated for economic reasons was finding a community of others like themselves and finding 
religious and ethnic spaces that resembled cultural traditions from their homeland. Immigrants 
needed to develop a sense of community, and needed also to find a way to continue their own 
religious and cultural traditions. They could potentially have been drawn in any direction as long 
as the people leading them could present themselves as knowledgeable, and that the religion 
being taught was something culturally familiar. 
  
V. ICNA: A Brief History 
 When people think of the Islamic Circle of North America today, they are likely to think 
of Islamic Relief, which is part of its social service division and active in aid efforts domestically 
and abroad. People who are raised in families that were active in mainstream Muslim 
communities might also think of the annual ICNA conference that brings together the activists, 
intellectuals, and religious leaders of the community. But these things were not the original aim 
of ICNA. Originally, its aim had been education: to educate people about correct religious 
practice. It is the local chapters and neighborhood study circles, which are founded by ordinary 




 ICNA has its roots in the activism of Islamist students and activists who came to the 
United States in the early 1960’s.15 In these years, they came, as many others did, to take 
advantage of greater educational opportunities. But as political activists with histories of 
involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries or the Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia, 
they were persecuted by the various secular regimes that governed their homelands. In the 
United States, Islamist student activists founded student associations, and organized religious 
activities for Muslims at their various university campuses. They took notice of each other’s 
work, and realized that they could be more effective if they formed a national organization. For 
Islamist students, founding the MSA was an opportunity to bring together students of diverse 
cultural backgrounds to attempt to put into practice the utopian ideals of Islam as an ideology 
and program of action.  
Activists split from the MSA to form groups that focused on other aspects of community 
life beyond the needs of students at university campuses. A group of South Asian students split 
from the MSA in 1971 to found the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) based in Jamaica, 
Queens.16 These students had been members of the Jamaat-e-Islami in India and Pakistan. Abu 
ala Mawdudi (1904-1979), the founder of the Jamaat approached Islam as if it was a political 
action plan. For Mawdudi, Islam was a revolutionary ideology, and a political system. If it was 
practiced correctly and sincerely, then it would lead to a just and perfect society. Maududi’s 
 
15 Kambiz Ghanea-Basiri, A History of Islam in America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 229 
 





Islamism was also built on fear: namely the fear of Western influence particularly on changes in 
Muslim family life.17 Asked what had set him on his Islamist path, Maududi once replied, 
I saw Muslim shurafa (honorable) women walking the streets without purdah [veil], an 
unthinkable proposition only a few years ago. This change shocked me so greatly that I could 
not sleep at night, wondering what had brought this sudden change among Muslims. 18 
 
VI. Islamism vs. the Islam of Immigrants 
 The majority of immigrants to the United States were not Islamists. They did not see 
Islam as an all-encompassing way of life that needed to be promoted through activism. They 
understood it as a matter of personal practice and ethical resources. Leila Ahmed observes that 
there were sometimes conflicts over religion when children returned home from Sunday school 
or summer camp, and informed their parents that the Islam they were practicing was “wrong”.19 
Nonetheless, there are points of agreement between Islamist activists and ordinary Muslims that 
enable immigrants to accept the Islamist ideal. 
 One of these is the emphasis on modesty for women. The promotion of hijab is 
foundational to the promotion of Islam as ideology. Women are sexual beings who tempt men. 
They must dress modestly in order to restrain male sexual aggression. Hijab honors the woman 
as opposed to the alternative offered by Western permissive society which commodifies women 
as sex objects. There is a heavy emphasis on the use of hadith literature and Qur’anic texts to 
 
 17 Lamia R. Shehadeh, The Idea of Women in Fundementalist Islam. (United States: University of Florida Press 
2003), 30 
 
18 Ibid, 30 
 
19 Leila Ahmed, A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence from the Middle East to America. (New Haven: Harvard 




explain Islamic views on a given issue. This has the effect of making an injunction both 
prescriptive, something that is sanctioned by divine decree. It is instructive to quote the views of 
Sheikha Tamara Gray, a traditionalist scholar trained in Syria, are instructive:  
The argument that it is not fard (obligatory), is an interesting dismissal of the witnessing 
of women. The women of the Prophet Salalahu Walahi Wasalam, by that I mean the 
women who were first there who heard these verses first. Their response when they heard 
the verse was a tearing of fabric that they had embroidered and stitched. Now if you 
embroider and stitch fabric, you value it. They took this valuable fabric, and tore it and 
put it upon themselves. What does this tell us? It tells us that they heard, they understood, 
they responded. It tells us that Allah (SWT), our law, our Sharia, is based on looking at 
the personal responses of women to the Qur’an.20 
 
Explained this way, how can a Muslim woman who cares about her religion not wish to 
cover her hair? The sheikha is invoking the idealization of the early Muslim community during 
the Prophet’s time as the best generation, the people Muslims should want to emulate if they 
wish to be closer to their Creator. People who want to be close to God need to have faith, to obey 
religious commandments without question. This reasoning also goes beyond the gendered 
assumptions that are usually used to explain why Islam requires women to veil. 
Most Pakistani women are not familiar with the Qur’anic verses or hadiths that prove that 
veiling is a religious obligation. But the gendered assumptions behind modesty are all too 
familiar. The women started going to college in the 1990s, by which the Islamization of public 
life that started Zia al-Haq’s dictatorship was well under way. Hitherto, women in urban areas 
were more mobile. They could dress in modern Western clothes without being stigmatized.21 At 
 
20 ”The Hijab with Anse Tamara Gray,” (April 13 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwMYPD75Raw&t=127s 
 
21 Sadaf Ahmad, Transforming Faith: The Story of al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism Among Urban Pakistani 




the same time, it was still a purdah [veil] society. Purdah took two forms. 22 There were different 
styles of modest dress like the burqa. There are also separate spaces set aside for women such as 
separate train compartments, curtained off sections of lecture halls, and separate schools and 
colleges that are totally staffed by women. 
The need to separate girls from boys as much as possible often discouraged women from 
participating in the labor force but could also create opportunities for girls from conservative 
families to pursue careers. They could become teachers and doctors catering to the needs of 
female patients or students thus minimizing contact with men. Purdah enabled parents and elders 
within families to maximize their influence over their daughter’s future marriage prospects by 
limiting opportunities for women to socialize with unrelated men.  
 Purdah restrictions were a normative part of life in Pakistan for almost all female 
subjects.23 All of them had mothers who dressed in the chador, and who stayed at home to raise 
large families. But they themselves were able to attend high school, and university. They did so 
in all female environments, and some described wearing the chador when they went out in 
public. It could bring certain kinds of freedom with it as Afiya describes: 
It was like not very big. It was a cotton like lawn type dupatta. We just used to put it on 
our heads when we used to leave the house, and then it was just a girl’s school so not in 
the school. At the same time, when we leave the school coming to house, we used to put 
on our heads like the basic thing was at that time to cover head, not show your hair. The 
same thing was when I went to college, college was also a private girl’s college so there 
were no boys. The same thing, we used to cover when we used to leave the house, and we 
used to fold our chador and used to keep it with us all day but not keep covering all day 
in college. And same was like when we used to leave college coming home, we used to 
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cover. And same thing was when I went to the university. I used to do the same thing. I 
used to cover with a dupatta or something. It was always part sometimes you’re careless. 
That was the matter. Otherwise, it was always with me from my childhood. But at the 
same time, I learned how to drive a car. My dad taught me even though as I told you, it 
was not a very modern city it was an industrial city, and there were some restrictions. But 
still, my dad wanted me to learn everything, so I also learned how to ride a motorcycle.24 
 
Afiya was able to attend college, and learn to ride a motorcycle. Although she 
acknowledges that the conservatism of the town she grew up in placed restrictions on her 
mobility, Afiya did not describe her upbringing in terms of freedom, oppression or restrictions 
but rather as a normal part of life. It did affect a Pakistani girl’s sense of what women were 
supposed to be. Comparing herself to her Americanized daughter, Shahana reflected that “I 
remember we were never allowed to go out without my brothers or my dad, my family. But here, 
the girls go out whenever you want to. You are like a little independent. So, we were not like 
that.”25 
In the understanding of these women, good girls dressed modestly, avoided unrelated 
men as much as possible, and needed to be accompanied by fathers or brothers when going 
somewhere so that their sense of safety and modesty would be preserved. In short, girls were 
supposed to be modest but dependent on men and family. Neither of these women saw their 
upbringing as restrictive. Both described happy childhoods, and positive relationships with their 
families. Conversely, girls who did not dress modestly were not good girls. 
The assumptions behind purdah were so pervasive that they also effected women who 
didn’t observe purdah restrictions. Tabassum was one of many women in her generation who had 
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not grown up wearing a veil. From a middle-class family in Karachi, Tabassum had been 
educated in co-ed environments from elementary school to university.26 She studied medicine 
and dressed in fashionable clothes without covering her hair. Tabassum explains her lifestyle in 
the context of her family’s emphasis on education: “As far as education was concerned, my 
parents didn't restrict me from anything. But I couldn't go for parties and things like that. So long 
story short, we were moderate. We were not wearing burqas, and hijabs and things like that.” 
In her own understanding, Tabassum dressed modestly, and did not see the family as very 
liberal or modern. Her views of women who dressed immodestly are not different from the views 
of her peers who dressed more conservatively: 
The society was not open at that time at all even though there were very modern people. 
The most dresses they can wear is like sleeveless dresses, or tight dresses which fit well 
on your body. That kind of dressing was like more vulgarity showed up, or more body 
parts showed up. 
 
Here, Tabassum is associating immodest dress with vulgarity. Practices of wearing 
modest dress affected women’s subjectivity. They did not see the way they grew up as being 
restrictive but the proper social norm for good girls. It is noteworthy that Tabassum, whose 
upbringing was the least restrictive of the three women profiled here, agrees that it is wrong for 
women to dress immodestly. If middle class women in Pakistan only discarded veils to assert a 
middle-class status, or follow the fashions of the day, then how deeply did ideas about gender 
equality or individual freedom really affect people from this milieu? While the idea of wearing 
hijab would prove to be new and difficult for some women to adopt, the idea that it was 
 




necessary for a woman to behave modestly, and protect herself from male sexual aggression was 
not new. 
 
VII. Joining a Dars: Finding Community 
 In Pakistan, women are traditionally discouraged from attending mosques. Attendance at 
Jumu’ah prayers is not mandatory for women. In a culture where women were discouraged from 
taking part in public life, excluding women from mosques made sense. Mosques became male 
only spaces. It was important for everyone, men and women alike, to learn to he read the Qur’an 
in Arabic, and to perform basic rituals. It was unnecessary and uncommon for women to pursue 
further religious knowledge. Dars were a marginal practice confined to members of the Jamaat-
e-Islami for whom religious education is a top priority. 27 Attending dars was a new experience 
for some women. 
 In the United States, Shahana describes adjusting to a world in which she had to do things 
on her own. As an introvert, she describes the social aspect of dars: 
 
We were living in an apartment building. In the beginning, I didn’t know that there was a 
masjid in the basement of that building. So, once I found out, I was very happy. 
Gradually, I found out that there was a family there. Then I found out that the ladies, the 
Muslim ladies from our building- they were doing things like dars. When I found out, I 
was very happy because I wanted to go there. I wanted to join them. Once I started going 
to her house, her apartment I felt myself that now I’m like more comfortable.28 
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Tabassum had come from a modern family. She had no interest in going to dars in 
Pakistan. In the United States, she expressed fears that becoming a member of ICNA might 
jeopardize her immigration status: 
 I was in a doctor’s appointment for one of my kids. I found a woman there. We started 
talking about we are Pakistani. We are Pakistani from New York too. I was living in 
Staten Island. I didn’t know anybody. It was OK but I don’t have anybody to talk to. So, 
she said, “Oh, do you know we have Qur’an classes every Friday. Through ICNA 
organization where we move, and we listen and learn things. I said, “O really but 
nobody’s inviting me.” No, it’s not per invitation. It’s open to everybody. Then she gave 
me he address. 
 I started coming to their classes. Classes is like you are talking about a topic, sometimes 
a general topic. Sometimes they are talking about the community. Sometimes they take a 
chapter from the Qur’an like one surah, they pick it. Hey, al-Husain did that. 
That was my beginning starting this class. But I didn’t join ICNA. I never give a thought 
to be a member. But then I was asked by the women over there that you want to do some 
volunteer time for the organization. I was really scared. I said what? I’m not going to fill 
out any form and sign it. So, I got a little scared. I said no, I’m not signing it. If you’re 
involved with somebody, the American government not going to like it. My citizenship 
was in process. I was in a dilemma that probably it’s going to affect negatively. But they 
explain to me, it’s not just a religious organization which is helping everybody. Then I 
signed the form, and became a member. 
 
The presence of ICNA was not about the organization per se but about seeking religious 
knowledge, and the company of other Pakistani women. The dars took place in the homes of 
members of ICNA. It was led by an Indian immigrant woman, a doctor by profession, who had 
lived with her husband in Saudi Arabia for several years before they emigrated to the United 
States. Although not a trained scholar, the teacher had been part of study circles in Saudi Arabia 
and was perceived to be knowledgeable about religion. 
 It is important to point out how innocuous ICNA’s activities were in women’s narratives. 




engaging in coercive tactics or were promoting sectarian political agendas.29 In Egypt, Anwar 
Sadat allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to operate freely allowing them to infuse the public 
culture with religion. Female Islamist activists who had promoted hijab as obligatory were 
allegedly paid by Saudi sources. In Pakistan, promotion of Islamic revival was more directly tied 
to political agendas because it was directly supported by the military regime of Zia al-Haq 
(1977-1989). Under the guise of Islamization, Zia’s regime promoted policies that were harmful 
to women like the Hudood Ordinances under which women could be stoned for sex outside of 
marriage if they failed to produce four male witnesses. The regime also used the educational 
system and television to promote the belief that Pakistan was not united by a common ethnicity 
or culture by a shared religion which was really monolithic Sunni identity. In that context, the 
pious Muslim woman was someone who stayed at home to raise children and observed veiling in 
public.30 By contrast, Pakistani women learned from their fellow immigrants, who became their 
friends, that dars were taking place. It also fulfilled the needs of members of the community to 
socialize with other people. They could also take their children with them thus providing 
practical help to parents in passing on their religious values.  
Similarly, Mohammad-Arif observes that the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan is seen as 
fundamentalist but that ICNA is viewed more positively by ordinary immigrants who don’t share 
its Islamist orientation. The Barelvis, who oppose the Jamaat in Pakistan and the United 
Kingdom, saw ICNA as “a good organization,” in the words of one New York Barelvi leader. 31 
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The late Maulana Naseem, a former ICNA leader, was often invited by members of the 
community to solve marital disputes and teach their children.32 
 Religious faith was also an important motivating factor. For women who were already 
deeply religious, it was important to further one’s religious knowledge. Afiya had grown up in a 
religious family where her mother had some knowledge of hadith and Qur’anic text. In Pakistan, 
she had had a teacher who had given her lessons in Tajweed [Qur’anic recitation]. She expressed 
a wish to seek further knowledge: 
I always had a thirst to continue that. Once I told a person that I just learned a few juz 
with translation, she said, you should continue. Since then I started thinking of getting a 
teacher to continue my education my Qur’anic education with translation.33 
 
For Tabassum who had come from a less religious background, dars proved to be revelatory: 
I learned the importance of things in our religion which were never stressed. I never read 
the Qur’an with meaning. I hardly read it one or two times with translation. So during the 
classes, we are learning what Allah is saying to us. What he’s talking about. What the 
Prophet is teaching us. Then it makes me, pushed me that you know what. You are a 
Muslim, and you are not doing these things. This is asked by Allah not by any human 
being. It’s something which you can benefit from. It’s something which you really need 
to do. So, if I’m not going to do it, I’m going to lose my religion. I’m going to lose my 
kids. My kids are not gonna follow anything. They’re not gonna believe at all.34 
 
Here, the emphasis on understanding the Qur’an with meaning is presented as the 
authentic, correct way of being religious which Tabassum had never learned before. She also 
points out that the stakes for not knowing about religion are high in the American context, that 
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she could lose her children to the wider culture. How could Tabassum raise her children to be 
good Muslims, if she didn’t practice Islam correctly herself? The same fears were expressed by 
several other subjects. Ironically, Tabassum’s fear that her children might lose their religious 
identity are analogous to fears of other Muslims around the world who participate in similar 
movements. In her ethnographic account of the al-Huda Movement in Pakistan which promotes a 
similar form of piety, Sadaf Ahmad discovered that many women participated in Al-Huda’s dars 
because they feared increasing Westernization of Pakistani society. 35 They believed that 
Muslims must defend themselves from the Western onslaught through increased piety.  Dars 
were where women learned about correct belief, and correct orthodox practice including the 
importance of family life, and of dressing modestly. 
 
VIII. The Evolution of Obedience in Neotraditionalist Thought 
 ICNA sees itself as the standard bearer of Sunni orthodox practice among American 
Muslims. Like Islamists everywhere, they promote an idealized conception of patriarchal family 
life. This ideal family is promoted through Islamic literature, on blogs, and by popular celebrity 
imams and scholars. The Islamic family ideal is a patriarchal one where men work to support the 
family, and women’s primary role is as wives and mothers. 
 The most important aspects of this ideal are the ways in which it departs from the 
precolonial legal tradition. Medieval scholars conceived of marriage as a form of ownership. 
Marriage meant that when a man paid mahr (dowry) to his wife, he had purchased exclusive 
 





access to her sexual and reproductive labor. 36 The wife’s only duties were to provide sexual 
access and obey her husband, in exchange for financial maintenance from her husband. Scholars 
saw a man’s sexual libido as uncontrollable, and saw satisfying it as urgent so much so that 
scholars argued that husbands had no right to force their wives to cook or clean but could prevent 
their wives from doing extra fasts or prayers if it interfered with his sexual rights. Medieval 
scholars took for granted that a divinely ordained social hierarchy existed in society where free 
people were superior to slaves, Muslims superior to non-Muslims, and men superior to women. 
As a result, medieval scholars did not center the concerns of women at the heart of their legal 
theorizing though at the same time, they were able to deliver rulings that favored women in 
individual cases. In order to command religious authority in Muslim communities, 
neotraditionallist scholars must situate their views within the classical scholarly tradition. This 
means that they must uphold a patriarchal cosmology while reconciling it with the egalitarian 
ideals of the liberal societies where they actually live. But Pakistani immigrant women, who 
were raised in a patriarchal society where gender differences are taken for granted, 
neotraditionalist ideals make sense. 
 Neotraditionalist views of marriage are predicated by the idealization of the 
companionate marriage.37 Men and women have different roles that they are naturally suited for. 
Both roles are equally important. Marriage is supposed to be a relationship of love and mercy 
where the needs of both spouses are fulfilled. The lens of companionate marriage has blunted, to 
some degree, the harshest misogyny of some hadiths while leaving male leadership in place.
 This can be seen in the evolution of understandings of what it means to be an obedient 
 
36  Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Harvard University Press, 2010), 73, 76 




wife. One example can be found in a commonly cited hadith in which Prophet Muhammad was 
reported to have said that, “If I had commanded anyone to prostrate to another, I would have 
commanded a wife to prostrate to her husband.”38 Legal scholars used this hadith to defend the 
husband’s lordship over his wife which was divinely ordained, and sanctioned by the Qur’an. 
Today, traditionalists can no longer straightforwardly argue that female obedience to husbands 
was ordained by God. They must situate the patriarchal marriage in a modern context where the 
dominant cultural ideal is based on egalitarianism and individual choice. 
Yasir Qadhi, an influential American imam who regularly speaks at ICNA events, gave a 
talk at the MAS-ICNA 2013 Convention that was about relationships.39 The premise of it was 
that women and men, being biologically different, had different needs, and knowledge of this 
would improve people’s marriages. In this context, Qadhi explains that the prostration that the 
hadith mentions are “the prostration of respect.” “And what does this show?” he asks, “That the 
wife gives respect to the husband. And what will the husband give back? That love, that 
cherishing, that nurturing that the craves.” Qadhi goes on to explain that respect means trusting a 
husband’s judgement, not nagging, and when being critical turns out to be necessary, then to do 
it in a gentle tone. Giving the example of reminding the husband to fix the leaky faucet, he 
suggests that the wife, should in a placating tone, say something like, I know you have other 
things to do, when you have a chance, can you take care of that.” 
In doing this, Qadhi is calling on the woman’s ability to persuade, be gentle. If the wife 
does these things, she will have a happy marriage. Qadhi goes on to instruct men that if they 
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want their wives to respect them, then they must show their wives affection. In this discussion, it 
is acknowledged that a husband’s happiness in marriage is dependent on the happiness of his 
wife. Yet husbands are supposed to be the heads of households because their income is 
theoretically the only one that supports the family. Because a husband is the leader, his behavior 
and disposition potentially play a deciding factor in how much power a wife has in a 
relationship. 
When people talk about the more troublesome implications of wifely obedience, they 
often have in mind domestic violence. In marriages where wives and husbands have strong 
partnerships, the concept of obedience can have the effect of making a husband feel entitled to 
his wife’s time or household labor. In relationships that are understood to be between willing 
individuals who have mutual respect for one another, the whole concept of obedience is rendered 
unthreatening.  
 Obedience to God and obedience to husbands has always had the potential to 
clash. Religious scholars have tried to smooth over this inconsistency, and uphold male 
dominance at the same time, by suggesting that women can disobey their husbands in things that 
are religiously obligatory. But husbands are allowed to prevent women from performing extra 
fasts or prayers if it interferes with his right to sex. This contradiction has been the bane of the 
lives of conservative religious women since the activism of Zainab al-Ghazali (1918-2005), a 
female leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and pioneering Daiya.  
Zainab al-Ghazali was the pioneer of a discourse on women that remains popular today. 
At age sixteen, she joined the Egyptian Feminist Union but soon left it because of its secular 
orientation. Ghazali went on to found her own organization, the Muslim Women’s Union, which 




rights to women. Zainab al-Ghazali believed that women should be able to take part in public 
life, and even run for political office in Muslim countries but only if their obligations as wives 
and mothers remained their first priority. But Al-Ghazali could not live out this ideal in her own 
personal life. She divorced her first husband because her marriage, she said, “took all my time 
and kept me from my mission”. In al-Ghazali’s understanding, her obligation to God truly was in 
conflict with her obligation to her husband. However, she had the financial resources and 
emotional support needed in order to live without a husband. Where does this leave women who 
actually do choose to prioritize their families over careers but find themselves married to men 
who are not as religious as they are? Even women who do work must contend with social 
consequences for themselves or emotional turmoil for their children, if they extricate themselves 
from the joint life they shared with a husband who will not support them wearing hijab or fasting 
during Ramadan. 
 The obligation to obey a husband or father potentially empowers men who are not 
religious to abuse their more religious female kin. Several studies have documented this problem 
in Muslim religious movements. In her ethnography of British Salafi women, Inge found that 
those who wore niqabs (face veils) met extreme opposition.40 According to Inge, all converts to 
Salafism wore the niqab or abaya out of choice. The Salafi converts were all teenagers or young 
adults of mostly Somali origin who lived with their  families. Some parents reacted by 
threatening to throw their daughters out of the house. Others wore the niqab in secret, and others 
gave up wearing it altogether. However, scholars understand covering the face to be optional 
rather than obligatory enabling some girls to respond to heavy parental pressure by taking it off. 
However, children financially and emotionally depend on their parents, and parents expect their 
 




authority to be absolute. At the same time, children raised in the West are affected by the 
individualistic society around them. They can see themselves as distinct individuals separate 
from their families who are free to make their own decisions. By contrast, obedience to husbands 
is mediated by the companionate ideal. Wives are not supposed to rebel. They are supposed to 
cooperate and persuade. 
 
IX. Obedience vs. Pious Practice? 
 For several interviewees, one of the most contentious aspects of their new-found piety 
was wearing hijab. A discussion of two of these stories illustrates the possibilities and limits 
provided by complementarianism. 
For Afiya, wearing a hijab was an evolutionary process. Growing up in Pakistan, she had 
covered herself with a chador. When she came to the United States in 1987, she stopped covering 
her hair because she felt uncomfortable about looking different. After learning about why it was 
necessary, she decided to return to covering her hair. Her husband was not ready for it: 
 
My husband was not ready for that at that time. So, I was not being obedient in that way 
because he did not want me to. Alhumdullilah, it worked out. I convinced him why I 
should cover. Because I told him you’re more important to me better than other men. So I 
should not expose my beauty. And alhumdulilah, then he was convinced and he also 








Tabassum too, faced opposition from her husband for wearing hijab:  
My husband wasn’t religious at all. He doesn’t care. He didn’t like hijab. He still doesn’t 
like it. He liked me the way I was. But I said no, that’s what Allah wants. That’s the way 
I want to do it. It still creates problems off and on because whenever I am going with 
him, he doesn’t want me to cover my head. He said I don’t like it. You look weird. Blah 
blah blah. But it does affect my relationship somehow because I changed a lot. Because I 
was quiet, a little bit… I would say more modernized. My dressing, my living. In 
Pakistan, I was in medical school. I was a pretty, modern girl. I dressed well. I was 
wearing high heeled shoes, the fashionable clothes and dresses. It’s like conservative in 
dress. I never exposed the body. But I was wearing whatever the fashion was. That’s the 
way I was. 
 Then I changed when I came to this country. My husband didn’t like it. It does 
effect on my relationship, and it still effecting on and off. When he saw me not paying 
attention on myself. To be honest, this is not religion teaching me. Actually, my teachers 
or my group setting, they are encouraging us to stay in your home as much fashionable as 
you can. If I started doing that, my teachers would be happy. Unfortunately I’m not doing 
it. Generally, he didn’t like hijab. So it does affect a little bit but I’m surviving. I try to 
obey, and I do things sometimes which I don’t want to just because he wants it. So I did 
try to minimize resistance in my life. Sometimes I do the stuff which he likes it. 
Sometimes, I do the things whatever he wants to, and I don’t want it. But I think he’s 
right. He has a right. So of course, if I’m not gonna do it. If I’m gonna give him the 
opportunity to another woman. First complainer gonna be me, and I’m gonna be 
responsible. Allah gonna ask me: why you didn’t do that when your husband is asking. 
So, he’s not asking for something very wrong.42 
  
These stories show the limits and possibilities of moral reasoning. Afiya was able to 
convince her husband that veiling is a religious obligation and called upon the male sense of 
jealousy to persuade him.  
 Objections to Muslim women adopting the hijab, or other markers of a strict lifestyle is a 
phenomenon that is well documented in studies of Muslim religious movements. . Opposition to 
 




veiling by family members is based on fears that women have adopted extremist ideologies or 
will be discriminated against. In contrast, the starting point of the women was that they were 
fulfilling a religious obligation by veiling. Their husbands did not understand this and needed to 
be educated.  
Both women shared a common moral framework with their spouses and tried to use their 
common beliefs to convince their husbands to accept their choices. It worked for Afiya. Her 
husband already accepted common religious beliefs and was therefore more inclined to listen to 
his wife and become more religious. By contrast, the message of Tabassum’s story is unclear. It 
cannot be categorized as an act of resistance against patriarchy because Tabassum does not see 
herself in this way. She blames herself for not being available enough to her husband sexually 
rather than her husband’s lack of religious commitment. Yet she is hardly a passive victim. She 
continues to wear hijab when she is able to, to attend dars, and to remain with her husband and 
children. 
In Pakistan, Tabassum and her husband would have depended on hired help, and on her 
husband’s extended family for financial support and childcare. In the United States, Tabassum 
and her husband both worked as doctors to provide a comfortable life for their four children. 
Tabassum also did most of the housework and childcare which arguably made her husband 
dependent on her. Tabassum built a life with her husband and has chosen to continue doing so 
despite their disagreements. Her life defies easy categorization as the life who is liberated or 
submissive. She downplays her agency throughout her story notably in describing how she had 
to convince her husband to leave Pakistan. Although she is an assertive person who continues to 




and participates in a religious movement that others would think of as patriarchal. But like others 
profiled here, she asserted herself through a form of Islamist piety. 
 
X. Conclusion 
 Asking whether Muslim women are oppressed is unhelpful. This question presumes that 
there is a binary between oppressed and oppressor, oppressed and liberator, and that the lives of 
women can neatly fit into this or any other framework. This binary presumes that women 
actually see their sense of self as being hat of a victim who wants her society to completely 
different so that she can be free. In such a binary, America would represent the land of the free, 
and the women profiled here would jump at the chance to go. As we saw earlier, this was not the 
case because all of the women were happy about life in Pakistan. As far as they were concerned, 
they were submitting to circumstance not freeing themselves from oppression. If anything, it 
could be argued that men were oppressing their wives by making the decision about where the 
family would live, hen expecting their wives to follow them. 
 Once in the United States, women needed to find new kinds of community and 
sociability. They found these things and more in the study they attended. Removed from politics 
of back home, ICNA represented an innocuous social organization whose members were 
perfectly ordinary fellow immigrants who were offering practical and spiritual help through the 
study circle. Women who came study circles saw their religion and themselves in a new way. 
They saw themselves as Muslims, as people who should care about deep religious matters and 
use their new knowledge to become better, pious subjects. This was not a break with their 
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1. Can you introduce yourself? 
2. How important was religion to your family? What kind of religious education did you 
have? Did you wear a chador or hijab while growing up? 
3. Why did you come to America? What year did you come? 
4. What was your impression of society when you first came to America?  
5. Why did you move to Staten Island? How did you meet other Muslims on Staten Island? 
What was the Muslim community like when you were first here? 
6. How did you come to join ICNA? 
7. Did being involved in dars every week create any conflict between you and your 
husband? If so, how was it handled? How were you able to raise a family? 
8. What did you believe about the roles of men and women in Islam? How did it work in 
your family? 
9. What was the evolution of your practices over time? Did you pray or fast more? Did you 
decide to wear hijab in America? If you did, what were the reactions of other people i.e., 
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